YAPAY ZEKA VE KÜRESEL GÜVENLİK MİMARİSİ: GÜÇ DAĞILIMININ MEKANİZMALARI VE YAPISAL DÖNÜŞÜM
Anahtar Kelimeler:
Yapay Zeka ve Küresel Güç Dağılımı- Küresel Güvenlik Mimarisi- Stratejik İstikrar ve Tırmanma Riski- Hesaplama Gücü YoğunlaşmasıÖzet
Bu çalışma, yapay zekanın küresel güvenlik mimarisi üzerindeki yapısal etkilerini ve güç dağılımını dönüştürme mekanizmalarını incelemektedir. Mevcut literatürde YZ’nin ürettiği nedensel zincirlerin ve kurumsal basıncın yeterince açıklanamaması temel araştırma problemini oluşturur. Makale, YZ’yi tekil bir araç yerine; hesaplama gücü (compute) yoğunlaşması, operasyonel hız ve modüler yönetişim üzerinden işleyen bir “çarpan teknoloji” olarak tanımlar. Araştırmada kuram güdümlü nitel bir tasarım benimsenmiş; yapılandırılmış belge analizi ve süreç izleme mantığına dayalı mekanizma temelli akıl yürütme yoluyla, güvenlik mimarisinin normatif, kurumsal ve operasyonel katmanlarında ortaya çıkan basınçlar ile uyum/gerilim dinamikleri izlenmiştir. Bulgular, YZ’nin karar alma döngülerini sıkıştırdığını ve komuta-kontrol süreçlerini dönüştürdüğünü göstermektedir. Ancak bu teknolojik çarpanın etkisi homojen değildir. Hesaplama gücü, ileri çip üretimi ve veri merkezleri üzerindeki kontrol, devletler arasında sert bir hiyerarşi üretmektedir. Güç rekabeti artık model performansından ziyade altyapısal üstünlük ve kritik girdiler üzerinde denetim mücadelesine dönüşmüştür. Bu dönüşüm; BM, NATO ve silah kontrol rejimleri gibi çok katmanlı yapılar üzerinde yapısal bir baskı oluşturmaktadır. Bulgular; evrensel rejimlerin tıkandığı mevcut koşullarda, teknik standartlar ve ittifak içi düzenlemeleri kapsayan modüler araçların risk azaltımı için daha uygulanabilir bir yönetişim hattı sunduğuna işaret etmektedir.
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