ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND GLOBAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: MECHANISMS OF POWER DISTRIBUTION AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION
Keywords:
Artificial Intelligence and Global Power Distribution, Global Security Architecture, Strategic Stability and Escalation Risk, Compute ConcentrationAbstract
This study examines the structural impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on the global security architecture and the mechanisms transforming the distribution of power. The core research problem is the lack of a clear causal chain explaining how AI-driven shifts exert pressure on norms, institutions, and operational tools. This article conceptualizes AI not as a singular capability but as a “multiplier technology” that redefines power competition through compute concentration, operational speed, and modular governance. Adopting a theory-driven qualitative design, the research utilizes structured document analysis and mechanism-based reasoning to trace structural pressures across the normative, institutional, and operational layers of the security architecture. The findings indicate that AI compresses decision cycles and reshapes command-and-control and intelligence processes. However, the impact of this multiplier is not distributed uniformly. Concentration in computing power, advanced chips, and data centers produces a rigid strategic hierarchy. Consequently, power competition has evolved into an infrastructural struggle over critical inputs and the control of enabling infrastructures. This shift exerts structural pressure on the multi-layered security architecture, including the UN-centered collective security system, NATO, and arms control regimes. Given the deadlock in universal regimes caused by great power rivalry, the findings suggest that modular regulatory tools—such as technical standards and alliance-based arrangements—offer a more viable pathway for risk mitigation and governance.
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